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The Troubling Supreme Court Decision
in Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services
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I. Introduction
In Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services (“Coo-
per Industries”),1 the United States Supreme
Court held that section 113(f)(1)2  (“section
113(f)(1)”) of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), as amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”),3 does not
allow a potentially responsible party (“PRP”)
to seek contribution from another PRP for
the costs of voluntarily cleaning up a haz-
ardous waste site.4   Instead, the Court held
that before a PRP can bring a cause of ac-
tion under section 113(f)(1), the PRP him-
self must have been subject to a civil action
under section 106 or section 107(a) of
CERCLA5  (“section 106” and “section
107(a)”).  Under section 106, the federal gov-
ernment may order the cleanup of a haz-
ardous site, and under section 107(a), a
party who has incurred cleanup costs,
whether the government or a private entity,
may sue a PRP for cost recovery.6   Thus, ac-
cording to Cooper Industries, a PRP who vol-
untarily undertook cleanup efforts (i.e., with-
out being subject to a federal cleanup or-
der and without having been sued for
cleanup costs) may not seek contribution
from another PRP under section 113(f)(1).
Cooper Industries reversed an en banc holding
* U.C. Hastings College of the Law, J.D. candi-
date, May 2006.  Mr. Ferrucci holds a B.A. in History
from Yale University and a Masters in City Planning
from U.C. Berkeley.  He is a member of the American
Institute of Certified Planners.
1.  Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, 543 U.S. 157,
125 S. Ct. 577 (2004).
2.  Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2005).
3.  Both CERCLA and SARA are codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2005).
4.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 583.
5.  Id.
6.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607(a) (2005).  See infra
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ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Information System (CERCLIS) database, as of Feb-
ruary 24, 2005, had more than 10,000 potentially
hazardous sites that have not been listed on the NPL.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND INFOR-
MATION SYSTEMS: CERCLIS DATABASE: SEARCH CERCLIS, at
http : / / c fpub.epa .gov /supercpad/curs i tes /
srchsites.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) (searching
for all CERCLIS sites “Not on the NPL”).  The EPA has
estimated that there are more than 450,000
brownfields in the U.S.  U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT: ABOUT
BROWNFIELDS, at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/
about.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
13.  Robert A. Simons & Kimberly Winson,
Brownfield Voluntary Cleanup Programs: Superfund’s Or-
phaned Stepchild, or Innovation from the Ground Up?, in
TOXIC WASTE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
UNITED STATES 104 (Dianne Rahm ed., 2002).  See also
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LOVE CANAL: SITE
FACT SHEET 1 (2005), http://www.epa.gov/region02/
superfund/npl/0201290c.pdf (“Problems with odors
and residues [near the former Love Canal landfill],
first reported in the 1960’s, increased during the
1970’s . . . .  In 1978 and 1980, President Carter is-
sued two environmental emergencies for the Love
Canal area.  As a result, approximately 950 families
were evacuated from a 10-square-block area sur-
rounding the landfill.  The Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA) was directly involved in




7.  Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries, 312 F.3d 677,
679 (5th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Aviall III].
8.  See, e.g., Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries, 263
F.3d 134, 141–43 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing prior cases
which held that a potentially responsible party
(“PRP”) could not bring a claim under section 113(f)(1)
unless it was subject to liability under sections 106
or 107(a), as well as cases reaching the opposite
conclusion) [hereinafter Aviall II].
9.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990).  The Court’s textualist
approach has roots in the jurisprudence of Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia, which Eskridge has
termed “the new textualism.”  Id.  Eskridge writes,
“[t]he new textualism posits that once the Court has
ascertained a statute’s plain meaning, consideration
of legislative history becomes irrelevant.  Legisla-
tive history should not even be consulted to confirm
the apparent meaning of a statutory text.  Such con-
firmation comes, if any is needed, from examina-
tion of the structure of the statute, interpretations
given similar statutory provisions, and canons of
statutory construction.”  Id. at 623–624.
10.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 583–584.
11.  Id. at 584.
12.  The National Priorities List (NPL) of Febru-
ary 11, 2005 listed 1,238 sites.  U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST: NPL SITE TO-
TALS BY STATUS AND MILESTONE, at http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/npltotal.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2005.).  The Comprehensive Envi-
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,7  and it
settled an issue over which federal courts
had differed for many years.8
This comment argues that the Court’s
textualist9  analysis10  of section 113(f)(1) was
overly narrow and that the Court erred in
concluding that it had no need to look be-
yond the statutory language to analyze the
broader purposes, legislative history, and
judicial interpretations of CERCLA and
SARA.11   A closer look at these non-textual
factors suggests, in fact, that a PRP should
be able to seek contribution for voluntary
cleanup costs under section 113(f)(1).  This
comment also argues that Cooper Industries
will have the effect of chilling voluntary
cleanup efforts, delaying or even prevent-
ing remediation on the many sites that still
carry contaminants.12   These results frus-
trate the very purpose of CERCLA.
II. The History and Legal Framework of
CERCLA
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980,
largely in response to the “Love Canal” inci-
dent.13   Although the text of CERCLA itself
does not articulate a purpose, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, for one, has stated that its purpose “is
to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites and to shift the cost of envi-
ronmental response from the taxpayers to











14.  OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co.
Inc., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578(5th Cir. 1997) (citing Matter
of Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 894 (5th Cir.
1993) and United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d
1497, 1500 (6th Cir. 1989)).  See also, Carson Harbor Vill.,
Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001);
Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir.
1985); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1135, 1143–42 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
15.  42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)–(c) (2005).  See also ED-
WARD E. SHEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND COMPLIANCE METHODS
177–79 (2002) (stating the “regulations prescribe
methods, procedures and criteria for remedial site
evaluation which consist of a remedial preliminary
assessment (PA) and a remedial site inspection (SI)”);
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND: CLEANUP
PROCESS, available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/
action/process/sfproces.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2005) (“The Superfund cleanup process begins with
site discovery or notification to EPA of possible re-
leases of hazardous substances.  Sites are discov-
ered by various parties, including citizens, State agen-
cies, and EPA Regional offices.  Once discovered,
sites are entered into [CERCLIS] . . . .”) [hereinafter
SUPERFUND CLEANUP PROCESS].
16.  SUPERFUND CLEANUP PROCESS, supra note 15 (stat-
ing that CERCLIS is “EPA’s computerized inventory
of potential hazardous substance release sites”); U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND INFORMATION
SYSTEMS: CERCLIS DATABASE, at http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/sites/cursites/index.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2005) (“The CERCLIS Database . . . contains in-
formation on hazardous waste sites, potentially haz-
ardous waste sites, and remedial activities across
the nation.  The database includes sites that are on
the National Priorities List (NPL) or being consid-
ered for the NPL.”).
17.  U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL
PRIORITIES LIST: NPL SITE LISTING PROCESS, at http://
www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/npl_hrs.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2005) (stating that the NPL is a list
of hazardous waste sites which are “national priori-
ties among the known releases or threatened re-
leases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or con-
taminants throughout the United States”).
18.  Under CERCLA, the original statute establish-
ing the Superfund was located at 42 U.S.C. § 9631.
SARA repealed that provision and created a new stat-
ute at 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (2005).  See also SHEA, supra note
15, 170–71 (stating that CERCLA “created a multi-bil-
lion dollar trust fund (the “Superfund”) . . . for the use of
the [EPA] in removal and other response actions”).
19.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 137.  See also JOEL B. GOLDSTEEN,
THE ABC’S OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 218 (2d ed. 2003)
(“[CERCLA] provides for compensation for cleanups of
hazardous waste spills until responsible parties are
identified and payment can be arranged.”).
20.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
21.  Wendy Wagner, Overview of Federal and State
Law Governing Brownfield Cleanups, in BROWNFIELDS: A COM-
PREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY
21 (Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002) (citing as excep-
tions “state and local governments that acquire a
property involuntarily, and purely ‘innocent’ landown-
ers who have made a thorough, good-faith investi-
gation of the site before purchase and mistakenly
believe the site to be clean”).
22.  See e.g., infra note 55 and accompanying text.
23.  See supra note 18.
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that caused the harm.”14   CERCLA estab-
lished a mechanism for identifying contami-
nated sites,15  which resulted in the creation
of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Informa-
tion System (“CERCLIS”)16  and the National
Priorities List (“NPL”).17   CERCLA also set up
the Superfund to pay for the removal or
remediation of hazardous waste18  and autho-
rized the Environmental Protection Agency
(“the EPA”) to recover costs from responsible
parties.19   PRPs include the owners and op-
erators of contaminated sites and vessels as
well as those disposing of, treating, or trans-
porting hazardous waste.20   Not only are past
owners and operators liable, but so are cur-
rent owners and operators, regardless of
whether they actually contributed to the con-
tamination, with minor exceptions.21   SARA
updated and clarified many of CERCLA’s pro-
visions22  and reauthorized the Superfund.23
A. Section 107(a) and Its Judicial
Interpretations
When Congress passed CERCLA, the
statute included section 107(a), known as the
“cost recovery” provision, which allows the
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24.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2005).
25.  See, e.g., Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988);
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890
(9th Cir. 1986); Walls, 761 F.2d at 318 (citing as prece-
dent Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589
F. Supp. 1437, 1442–44 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Jones v. Inmont
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984); and
other cases); Stepan Chemical, 544 F. Supp. at 1141;
Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
26.  See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan: Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,912,
47,934 (1985) (discussing the “widespread confusion
and conflicting judicial interpretations of the issue”).
27.  See, e.g., Tanglewood East, 849 F.2d at 1575; NL
Industries v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986);
Cadillac Fairview v. Dow Chemical Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694–
695 (9th Cir. 1988); Richland-Lexington Airport Distribu-
tors v. Atlas Properties, Inc., 901 F.2d 1206, 1208 (4th Cir.
1990); and Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International
Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
28.  Wickland, 792 F.2d at 887.
29.  Id. at 892.
30.  Id. (citing National Oil and Hazardous Sub-
stances Pollution Contingency Plan: Final Rule, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,912, 47,934 (1985) (to be codified at 40 CFR pt.
300), which states “[i]n this rule, EPA makes it abso-
lutely clear that no Federal approval of any kind is a
prerequisite to a cost recovery under section 107 . . . .”).
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who has incurred cleanup costs to sue a PRP
for reimbursement.  As amended by SARA,
section 107(a) currently reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion or rule of law . . . (1) the owner and
operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any
person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of, (3) any person
who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous sub-
stances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility or incineration vessel owned
or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances,
and (4) any person who accepts or ac-
cepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facili-
ties, incineration vessels or sites selected
by such person, from which there is a re-
lease, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance, shall be liable
for (A) all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan, (B) any other necessary costs
of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contin-
gency plan, (C) damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assess-
ing such injury, destruction, or loss result-
ing from such a release; and (D) the costs
of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under section 104(i).24   
Federal courts reached several important
conclusions about section 107(a) before the
passage of SARA.  First, pre-SARA courts
agreed that paragraph B of section 107(a) cre-
ated a private cause of action against a PRP.25
Second, despite conflicting opinions at first,26
most pre-SARA courts ultimately held that the
clause “necessary costs of response . . . consis-
tent with the national contingency plan” in para-
graph B did not require governmental involve-
ment as a prerequisite to a private cause of ac-
tion.27   For example, in Wickland Oil Terminals v.
Asarco, Inc.,28  the Ninth Circuit rejected the ar-
gument that a private cause of action under
section 107(a) required that the private party
act pursuant to a government-authorized
cleanup program.29   In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the “EPA in-
terpretation that the 1982 national contingency
plan does not require lead agency approval of













32.  See, e.g., State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1045–1047 (2d Cir. 1985); Pinole Point Prop-
erties, 596 F. Supp. at 287–88; Interchange Office Park, Ltd.
v. Standard Industries, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 166, 168–89 (W.D.
Tex. 1987); and Allied Towing v. Great Eastern Petroleum
Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1986).
33.  Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2005).  Section
111(a) reads in pertinent part, “[t]he President shall
use the money in the Fund for the following purposes:
. . . (2) Payment of any claim for necessary response
costs incurred by any other person as a result of carry-
ing out the national contingency plan established un-
der section 311(c) of the Clean Water Act and amended
by section 105 of this title: Provided, however, That
[sic] such costs must be approved under said plan and
certified by the responsible Federal official [and] (3)
Payment of any claim authorized by subsection (b) of
this section and finally decided pursuant to section
112 of this title, including those costs set out in sub-
section 112(c)(3) of this title.”  42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (2005).
Section 111(b) reads in pertinent part, “[c]laims
asserted and compensable but unsatisfied under
provisions of [S]ection 311 of the Clean Water Act
which are modified by section 304 of this Act may be
asserted against the Fund under this title . . . .”  42
U.S.C. §§ 9611(b) (2005).
34.  Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (2005).  Section
112(a) reads in pertinent part, “[n]o claim may be as-
serted against the Fund pursuant to section 111(a) un-
less such claim is presented in the first instance to the
owner, operator, or guarantor of the vessel or facility
from which a hazardous substance has been released,
if known to the claimant, and to any other person known
to the claimant who may be liable under section 107.”
35.  See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1079 (1st Cir. 1986) (“Because
section 112(a) refers exclusively to section 111 claims,
it differs fundamentally from section 112(d), which
explicitly applies not only to ‘claims,’ but also to judi-
cial actions for damages commenced under section
107(a)(2)(C).  Because of this distinction, we need not
read the ‘all claims’ language of section 112(a) as
necessarily referring to the private judicial actions
contemplated by section 107.”); Walls, 823 F.2d at 980;
United States v. Moore, 698 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Va.
1988); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 650 F.
Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.N.C. 1987); and United States v.
Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 452 (D. Mary. 1986).
36.  United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
37.  Id. at 1117–1118.
38.  Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 283.
39.  Id. at 288 (rejecting defendant’s arguments
“that section 107 merely establishes liability for
purposes of sections 111 and 112, which govern use
of the Superfund;” that “[u]nder section 112(a), a
claimant against the Superfund must first present
its claim to any party that might be liable under sec-
tion 107;” and “[p]ayments from the Superfund are
limited to ‘necessary response costs incurred by [any
party other than the government] as a result of carry-
ing out the National Contingency Plan, provided,
however, that such costs must be approved under
said . . . Plan and certified by the responsible federal
official.’” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (2005))).
40.  Id.
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107(a) actions by private parties.”30   The Wickland
court also noted, “[t]his reading is buttressed
by the lack of any procedure whereby a private
party could seek to obtain prior governmental
approval of a cleanup program.”31   Similarly,
courts have held that a cost recovery claim un-
der section 107(a) does not require NPL listing
of the site as a prerequisite.32
Third, pre-SARA courts held that sec-
tion 107(a) constitutes a separate, indepen-
dent cause of action from section 11133  and
section 11234  of CERCLA (“section 111” and
section 112”), which govern the use of the
Superfund.35   For instance, in United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp.,36  the court re-
jected the argument that recovery under
section 107(a) was limited to the amount
that a party could recover from the
Superfund under sections 111 and 112,
holding “[l]iability under section 107(a) is
independent of the authorized uses of the
Fund under section 111 . . . .”37   Similarly,
the court in Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.38  rejected the argument
“that CERCLA envisions governmental ac-
tion as a condition precedent to any and all
private liability”39  and held “that section 107
and sections 111 and 112 provide causes of
action that are distinct and independent.”40
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41.  United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802 (D. Ohio 1983).
42.  Id. at 804.
43.  Id. at 810.
44.  Id. at 809.
45.  Id. at 810 (citations omitted).
46.  Id. at 811.
47.  H.R. ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE REP. NO.
99-253, Pt. 1, 74 (1985) as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2856 (“The Committee fully subscribes to the
reasoning of the court in the seminal case of United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation, which established a
uniform federal rule allowing for joint and several
liability in appropriate CERCLA cases . . . .  The Com-
mittee believes that this uniform federal rule on joint
and several liability is correct and should be fol-
lowed.  It is unnecessary and would be undesirable
for Congress to modity [sic] this uniform rule.  Thus,
nothing in this bill is intended to change the appli-
cation of the uniform federal rule of joint and sev-
eral liability enunciated by the Chem-Dyne court.”).
48.  See, e.g., R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1507.
49.  Stepan Chemical, 544 F. Supp. at 1135.
50.  Id. at 1141–1142.
51.  Id. at 1142.
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Fourth, pre-SARA courts held that PRPs
were subject to joint and several liability for
environmental cleanup costs under section
107(a).  In the seminal case of United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp.,41  the United States brought
suit against 24 defendants to recover
Superfund money that it spent on cleanup.42
Defendants made a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, alleging that as a matter of
law, CERCLA did not expressly provide for
joint and several liability between PRPs.43
The district court held that Congress in-
tended for CERCLA to establish a uniform
federal rule, that PRPs could be held jointly
and severally liable.44   The court applied the
concept of joint and several liability to
CERCLA, as follows:
When two or more persons acting inde-
pendently caused a distinct or single harm
for which there is a reasonable basis for divi-
sion according to the contribution of each,
each is subject to liability only for the por-
tion of the total harm that he has himself
caused.  But where two or more persons
cause a single and indivisible harm, each is
subject to liability for the entire harm.  Fur-
thermore, where the conduct of two or more
persons liable under [section 107] has com-
bined to violate the statute, and one or more
of the defendants seeks to limit his liability
on the ground that the entire harm is capable
of apportionment, the burden of proof as to
apportionment is upon each defendant.45
The Chem-Dyne court then denied the
motion for summary judgment, because
“there [were] genuine issues of material fact
concerning the divisibility of the harm and
any potential apportionment.”46   Congress
explicitly endorsed the Chem-Dyne decision
when it adopted SARA in 1986,47  and courts
have since recognized joint and several li-
ability for PRPs under section 107(a).48
Fifth and finally, federal courts inter-
preted CERCLA as allowing a PRP to bring
a claim for cost recovery against another
PRP, even though the language of CERCLA
did not explicitly provide for it.  The courts
justified this interpretation through a broad
reading of the term “any other person” in
paragraph B of section 107(a).  For example,
in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem Co.,49  the
district court rejected defendant’s argument
that the phrase “any other person” referred
only to non-responsible parties and pre-
cluded suit by the City, a partially liable
party.50   The court said:
[I]n the context in which it appears . . .,
the term ‘any other person’ is quite conceiv-
ably designed to refer to persons other than
federal or state governments and not . . . to
persons other than those made responsible
under the act.  Thus . . ., the provision does
not specifically exclude parties who may be
liable for the costs of governmental action













52.  See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
926 F. Supp. 1400, 1406, 1406 n.7 (D. Ariz. 1996) (The
court states “substantial weight should be given to
the fact that [in passing SARA in 1986,] Congress
expressly intended [s]ection 113 to confirm preex-
isting case law.  That case law generally interpreted
[s]ection 107 broadly to afford a cause of action to
liable and non-liable parties alike.”).
53.  SARA did not amend paragraph B of section
107(a).  42 U.S.C.S. § 9607 (LexisNexis 2005) (History;
Ancillary Laws and Directives: Amendments).  Had
Congress wished to overrule the Stepan Chemical or
Wickland lines of cases, it would surely have amended
that paragraph.  Also, SARA did not make any amend-
ments to sections 107 or 111 that would have sub-
jected section 107(a) claims to the requirements of
section 111.  42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9607, 9611 (LexisNexis
2005) (History; Ancillary Laws and Directives: Amend-
ments).  In fact, SARA made amendments to section
112(a) which clarified that it pertains only to claims
against the fund, and not to section 107(a) actions.  Id.
Those amendments included the addition of a
catchline reading “[c]laims against the Fund for re-
sponse costs,” and deleting the phrase, “the claimant
may elect to commence an action in court against such
owner, operator, guarantor, or other person.”  Id.
54.  Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d
1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997) (“This conclusion—that sec-
tion 107 implicitly incorporates a claim for contribution—
is unremarkable; most courts had so held even before
Congress settled the issue by enacting section 113(f).”
(citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816
(1994)) (“The legislative history behind section 113(f) also
supports the conclusion that, in enacting that provision,
Congress was only confirming and clarifying an existing
claim for contribution under section 107.” (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 99-253, Pt. 3, 18–19 (1985), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3041)) [hereinafter Pinal Creek Group II].
55.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2005).
56.  See, e.g., Garaghty and Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234
F.3d 917, 924 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that section 113(f)
“is a mechanism for apportioning costs that are recov-
erable under section 107” and “a claim for collection of
the costs referred to in section 107.”  The court adds
that “a contribution action is merely one type of cost-
recovery action” (citing Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,
124 F.3d 1187, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 1997))); New Castle
County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3rd
Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek Group II, 118 F.3d at 1302;
Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, 100 F.3d 792,
800 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that section 113(f) “does
not of itself create any new liabilities.  Rather, it simply
confirms the right of a person potentially . . . liable
under section 107(a) to obtain contribution from other
potentially liable persons”); and Town of Munster v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 27 F.3d 1268, 1270 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Many other pre-SARA cases reached the
same conclusion — that PRPs could bring suit
against other PRPs under section 107(a).52
When Congress passed SARA in 1986, it did
not disturb these judicial holdings.53
B. Section 113 and Its Judicial Interpretations
As part of SARA, Congress adopted sec-
tion 113(f)(1) to confirm its intent to provide
PRPs with a cause of action for cost recovery.54
Known as the “contribution” provision, section
113(f)(1) reads in pertinent part as follows:
Any person may seek contribution
from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 107(a),
during or following any civil action un-
der section 106 or under section 107(a).
Such claims shall be brought in accor-
dance with this section and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be
governed by Federal law.  In resolving
contribution claims, the court may allo-
cate response costs among liable par-
ties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. Noth-
ing in this subsection shall diminish the
right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil ac-
tion under section 106 or section 107.55
But far from adding clarity, section
113(f)(1) raised a new question of interpre-
tation: did Congress intend for section
113(f)(1) to replace or coexist with the sec-
tion 107(a) cause of action?  Post-SARA
courts reached three conclusions about the
relationship between sections 107(a) and
113(f)(1).  First, they held that section
113(f)(1) created no new liability separate
from section 107(a), but functioned as a
mechanism for seeking relief under section
107(a).56   Second, section 113(f)(1) differed
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57.  See, e.g., Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron &
Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 1998) (“CERCLA
provides two causes of action for parties to recover
the response costs incurred by the cleanup effort:
joint and several cost recovery actions governed ex-
clusively by section 107(a) . . . and contribution ac-
tions as set forth in section 113(f).”); OHM, 116 F.3d
at 1581–82 (After quoting S. REP. NO. 99-11, 44 (1985),
the court concludes “that section 113(f) was not
meant to be duplicative of section 107(a), but meant
instead to allow [PRPs] a cause of action to mitigate
the harsh effects of joint and several liability.”).
58.  See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group II, 118 F.3d at 1301
(“Because all PRPs are liable under the statute, a claim
by one PRP against another PRP necessarily is for
contribution.  A PRP’s contribution liability will corre-
spond to that party’s equitable share . . . and will not
be joint and several.  CERCLA simply does not pro-
vide PRPs who incur cleanup costs with a claim for
the joint and several recovery of those costs from other
PRPs.”) (footnote omitted); Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct.
at 585 (citing Bedford Affialiates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416,
423–424 (2d Cir. 1998); Centerior, 153 F.3d at 349–356;
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton Rail-
road Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); Halliburton
NUS Corp., 111 F.3d at 1120–1124; Redwing Carriers, Inc.
v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.7 (11th Cir.
1996); United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co., 50
F.3d 1530, 1534–1536 (10th Cir. 1995); and United Tech-
nologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 33 F.3d 96,
98–103 (1st Cir. 1994)).
59.  See infra notes 134–177 and accompanying text.
60.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 136.
61.  Id.
62.  Aviall III, 312 F.3d at 679 n.2.
63.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 136.
64.  Id.
65.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 582.
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from section 107(a) in that it does not im-
pose joint and several liability, but calls for
equitable apportionment of costs between
joint tortfeasors.57   Third, based on these first
two conclusions, many courts held that PRPs
could seek only contribution under section
113(f)(1) and not cost recovery under section
107(a) from another PRP, because, those
courts reasoned, PRPs should not be able to
impose joint and several liability on other
PRPs, but should only be able to seek con-
tribution.58   However, courts split with respect
to the main issue in Cooper Industries: whether
the section 113(f)(1) action required PRPs to
be subject to prior or pending liability under
sections 106 or 107(a).59
III. The Supreme Court Decision
in Cooper Industries
A. Factual and Procedural History
A discussion of Cooper Industries requires
an overview of the case’s factual and proce-
dural history.  In 1981, Aviall Services (“Aviall”)
purchased the aircraft engine maintenance
business of Cooper Industries (“Cooper”),
including Cooper’s maintenance facilities,
and several years later, Aviall discovered con-
taminated soil and groundwater at those lo-
cations.60   After Aviall notified the Texas Natu-
ral Resource Conservation Commission
(“TNRCC”) of the contamination,61  the
TNRCC sent letters to Aviall instructing the
company to undertake investigative and re-
medial activities, alleging statutory and regu-
latory violations, and warning of enforcement
action if Aviall failed to respond adequately.62
The EPA never contacted Aviall, nor did it
designate the facilities as contaminated.63   In
1984, Aviall voluntarily initiated cleanup op-
erations, which lasted a decade and cost sev-
eral million dollars.64
In 1997, Aviall sued Cooper for cost re-
covery, based on separate causes of action
under section 107(a) and section 113(f)(1),
but later amended the complaint by com-
bining the two into a single, joint CERCLA
claim.65   The District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, based on a “plain mean-
ing” analysis, held that CERCLA allows a
section 113(f)(1) claim for contribution only












66.  42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2005) (Section 9606(a)
reads in pertinent part, “when the President deter-
mines that there may be an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to the public health or welfare or
the environment because of an actual or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he
may require the Attorney General of the United States
to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate
such danger or threat . . . [or] after notice to the af-
fected State, take other action under this section in-
cluding, but not limited to, issuing such orders as
may be necessary to protect public health and wel-
fare and the environment.”)
(Section 9606(b)(2)(A) reads in pertinent part, “[a]ny
person who receives and complies with the terms of any
order issued under subsection (a) . . . may, within 60 days
after completion of the required action, petition the Presi-
dent for reimbursement from the Fund . . . .”  If the Presi-
dent refuses the petition, section 9606(b)(2)(B) allows
the petitioner to file suit against the President.  To ob-
tain reimbursement in the context of a lawsuit, section
9606(b)(2)(C) says that “the petitioner shall establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that it is not liable for
response costs under section 107(a) . . . .”).
67.  Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 520, *8 (N.D. Tex. 2000) [hereinafter Aviall I].
68.  Id. (citing Rockwell, 702 F. Supp. at 1389.
69.  Id. at *13.
70.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 137.
71.  Aviall III, 312 F.3d at 681.
72.  Id. at 691.
73.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 577.
74.  Id. at 583–584.





section 10666  or section 107(a).67   Also, it
held that the last sentence of section
113(f)(1), the so-called “saving clause,” does
not undo the “during or following” require-
ment, but simply preserves a party’s right to
bring “contribution claims that are otherwise
available, such as under state law.”68   Since
Aviall could not demonstrate a pending ac-
tion against it, the court ruled that Aviall
could not seek contribution under section
113(f)(1) and dismissed the claim without
prejudice pursuant to Cooper’s motion for
summary judgment.69
A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
(“Fifth Circuit panel”) affirmed,70  but in a
subsequent en banc proceeding (“Fifth Cir-
cuit en banc”), the court reversed, holding
that a “PRP may sue at any time for contri-
bution under federal law to recover costs it
has incurred in remediating a CERCLA
site.”71   The Fifth Circuit en banc based its
decision on an analysis of the statutory text,
the legislative history, judicial precedent, and
public policy.72   Cooper then appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
B. The Majority Opinion
Seven justices joined in the majority
opinion, which Justice Thomas wrote.73   The
entire analysis of section 113(f)(1) consists
of a brief textualist interpretation.74   First,
the Court focused on section 113(f)(1)’s en-
abling clause (i.e., the first sentence of the
section) which reads in pertinent part, “[a]ny
person may seek contribution . . . during or
following any civil action under [section 106]
. . . or . . . [section 107(a)].”75   Aviall argued
“that ‘may’ should be read permissively, such
that ‘during or following’ a civil action is one,
but not the exclusive, instance in which a
person may seek contribution,” but the
Court rejected this argument.76   The Court
said that “the natural meaning of ‘may’ in
the context of the enabling clause is that it
authorizes certain contribution actions—
ones that satisfy the subsequent specified
condition—and no others.” 77   The Court
further reasoned that if it were to read the
phrase permissively, it would render super-
fluous the “during or following” part of the
phrase, as well as section 113(f)(3)(B), which
permits contribution claims after settle-
ment.78   Justice Thomas wrote, “[t]here is
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86.  See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 9, at 667 (“By
focusing on the planning meaning a statute would
have for the ordinary, reasonable reader, the new
textualism has the intuitive appeal of looking at the
most concrete evidence of legislative expectations
and at the material most accessible to the citizenry.”);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Symposium: Justice Breyer:
Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 747, 753 (1995) (“[M]ost lawyers and judges . . .
are textualists, at least to the extent that they be-
lieve that statutory language should be given effect
and that words and phrases can support only a finite
range of potential interpretations.”).
87.  Eskridge, supra note 9, at 674 (“Justice Scalia’s
approach [to statutory interpretation] requires
choices among competing evidence just as much as
the traditional approach does.  Furthermore, he po-
tentially expands upon the judge’s range of discre-
tion by his revival of the notoriously numerous and
manipulable canons of construction.”).
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no reason why Congress would both specify
conditions under which a person may bring a
contribution claim, and at the same time allow
contribution claims absent those conditions.”79
Second, echoing the decision of the dis-
trict court, the Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 113(f)(1)’s saving clause does not change
the Court’s interpretation of the enabling
clause.80   The saving clause, according to the
Court, does nothing more than rebut the pre-
sumption “that the express right of contribu-
tion provided by the enabling clause is the
exclusive cause of action for contribution
available to a PRP.” 81   The saving clause
“does not itself establish a cause of action;
nor does it expand section 113(f)(1) to au-
thorize contribution actions not brought ‘dur-
ing or following’ a section 106 or section
107(a) civil action, nor does it specify what
causes of action for contribution, if any, exist
outside section 113(f)(1).”82
Third and finally, the Court pointed
out that although the statute of limitations
established in section 113(g)(3) of CERCLA
(“section 113(g)(3)”) runs from the date of
judgment for section 113(f)(1) actions or
from the date of settlement for section
113(f)(3)(B) actions, section 113(g)(3) in-
cludes no statute of limitations provision in
the case of a voluntary cleanup, i.e., in the
absence of a judgment or settlement.83   The
Court interpreted the absence of a statute
of limitations in section 113(g)(3) relating
specifically to voluntary cleanup to mean
that section 113(f)(1) does not allow a cause
of action following such cleanup.84   Justice
Thomas declined the opportunity to look
beyond the text of section 113(f)(1), writing,
“[g]iven the clear meaning of the text, there
is no need to . . . consult the purpose of
CERCLA at all.”85
IV. A Critique of Cooper Industries: Inter-
preting Section 113(f)(1) in Context
A. The Limits of a Textualist Analysis
A textualist approach to statutory in-
terpretation is not just the fashion of the
day.  Giving greater interpretive weight to
the language of the adopted law over ex-
trinsic sources makes intuitive sense.86
However, textualist interpretation relies on
the assumption, often erroneous, that the
statutory text has a single, clear, and com-
pelling meaning.  Often, the search for the
“plain meaning” of a statute actually means,
in practice, that a judge makes a subjective
choice between equally plausible textual
interpretations.87   The Supreme Court
makes just such an error in Cooper Industries.
As noted, the Court in Cooper Industries












88.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 583.
89.  Id.
90.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2005).
91.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “canon of
construction” as a “rule used in construing legal in-
struments, esp. contracts and statutes . . . .  Although
a few states have codified the canons of construc-
tion . . ., most jurisdictions treat the canons as mere
customs not having the force of law.”  BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 198 (7th ed. 1999).  See Blake A. Watson,
Liberal Construction of CERCLA under the Remedial Pur-
pose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too
Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 208 (1996).
92.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 583.
93.  Id.
94.  Id. at 584.
95.  Id.
96.  Eskridge, supra note 9, at 679 (“Justice Scalia
assumes that both Houses of Congress and the Presi-
dent are aware of judicial interpretations of provisions
that a statute borrows or reenacts, of the canons of
statutory construction (including grammar and punc-
tuation rules) that might be applied to the statute, and
of the surrounding legal terrain into which the statute
must be integrated. . . . Members of Congress are not
omniscient about legal rules, and the nature of the
legislative process gives them incentives to focus on
the particular problem and not on future issues of in-
terpretation. . . . Justice Scalia knows all this, for he
calls these assumptions a ‘benign fiction.’”).
97.  Id. at 677.
98.  See Watson, supra note 91, at 208.
99.  Eskridge, supra note 9, at 683–684.
100.  Watson, supra note 91, at 213–214 (citing
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate De-
cision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)).
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113(f)(1)’s enabling clause as having a “natu-
ral meaning,”88  which authorizes only those
contribution actions “which satisfy the sub-
sequent specified condition,”89  i.e., which
occur “during or following any civil action
under [sections 106 or 107(a)].”90   In reach-
ing this conclusion, Justice Thomas empha-
sized the canon of construction91  that statu-
tory interpretation should avoid rendering
part of the statutory language entirely su-
perfluous.92   That is, according to Justice
Thomas, a broad reading of the word “may”
would render the “during or following”
clause superfluous.93   Similarly, the Court
held that section 113(f)(1)’s saving clause
does not expand the scope of the enabling
clause,94  because an expansive reading
“would again violate the settled rule that we
must, if possible, construe a statute to give
every word some operative effect.”95
However reasonable, a judicial canon
of construction does not help the court un-
derstand the will of the legislature.  As
Eskridge has pointed out, legislators have
little familiarity with canons, and therefore,
they do not carefully script the language to
pass a canonical test.96   Even if legislators
were familiar with judicial canons, it is un-
likely that Congress would generate clearer
statutory language, because statutory am-
biguity often results from deliberate choice
(i.e., Congress may lack the consensus nec-
essary for greater clarity and leave a difficult
decision to executive agencies or the courts)
or unforeseen developments that arise af-
ter the passage of the statute.97   By relying
on judicial canons, which do not have the
weight of law,98  and paying scant attention
to legislative history, the judiciary risks un-
dermining the purpose of the law itself and
intruding upon the law-making powers of
the legislature.99   In Cooper Industries, although
the canon of non-superfluity provided the
Supreme Court  with a shorthand means of
interpreting section 113(f)(1), it brought the
Court nowhere closer to an understanding
of what Congress actually intended to ac-
complish in adopting section 113(f)(1).
In addition to these conceptual prob-
lems, reliance on canons of construction
leads to self-contradiction.  As Karl
Llewellyn famously explained in 1950, “there
are two opposing canons on almost every
point,”100  suggesting that “rather than con-
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102.  Aviall III, 312 F.3d at 686.
103.  Id. (footnote omitted).
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105.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 138–9.
106.  Watson, supra note 91, at 201, 201 n.1 (“The
remedial purpose canon of statutory construction, which
states that remedial legislation should be liberally con-
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American legal system.” (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, 3
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 (5th ed. 1992))).
107.  Id. at 258–261.
108.  Id. at 262–263.
109.  Id. at 271.
110.  Id. at 310.
111.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 138.
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straining interpretive choices, the canons
serve simply as post hoc ‘tools of argument’
utilized by judges to justify statutory con-
struction arrived at ‘by means other than the
use of the canon.’”101   Writing for the major-
ity in the Fifth Circuit en banc decision, in
fact, Judge Jones used a different canon to
reach the opposite conclusion from Justice
Thomas.  Noting that the enabling clause
used the permissive verb “may” without the
narrowing term “only,”102  Judge Jones wrote,
“[e]lsewhere in CERCLA, Congress used
‘only’ many times, signifying its intent to
narrow, exclude or define provisions.  Had
Congress similarly intended to make con-
tribution actions available ‘only’ after the
referenced CERCLA lawsuits have been
brought, it could have done so.”103   On this
basis, Judge Jones concluded that the word
“may” in section 113(f)(1) should be read
permissively, such that a party can bring suit
even in the absence of a section 106 or sec-
tion 107(a) cause of action.104   Thus, with
two equally plausible textual interpreta-
tions—his own and that of Justice Jones—
Justice Thomas erred in limiting his analy-
sis to the purportedly “natural meaning” of
the word “may” and should have looked be-
yond the text of CERCLA to examine the
purpose of the law, legislative history, and
judicial precedent.
The Fifth Circuit panel raised two addi-
tional questions regarding the textual inter-
pretation of section 113(f)(1).  These war-
rant some discussion, even though the Su-
preme Court did not address them.  First,
the Fifth Circuit panel interpreted the word
“may” as meaning “shall” or “must” in the
context of a provision that creates a cause
of action, in order to avoid creating overly
broad causes of action.105   However, this
conclusion contradicts the well-established
principle that remedial statutes should be
read broadly.106   Although the Supreme
Court has declined opportunities to decide
whether environmental laws like CERCLA
are appropriately considered remedial,107
lower courts construing CERCLA “have con-
sistently . . . characterized the federal stat-
ute as being ‘overwhelmingly remedial’ in
nature”108  and have employed the remedial
purpose principle “with remarkable fre-
quency.”109   Indeed, Blake Watson has con-
cluded, based upon an exhaustive analysis
of CERCLA’s legislative history and case law,
that “the invocation of the remedial purpose
canon is most appropriate in cases interpret-
ing CERCLA’s liability scheme, both in terms
of who should be liable for incurred costs
of response, and with regard to the types of
costs that are recoverable.”110   Thus, the
Fifth Circuit panel’s summary conclusion
that CERCLA causes of action should be
construed narrowly is questionable at best.
Second, the Fifth Circuit panel noted
that the word “contribution” typically refers
to recovery between joint tortfeasors, con-
cluding that the use of that term in section
113(f)(1) suggests that a party must first face
judgment before seeking recovery from an-
other party.111   However, as Judge Wiener












112.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 148–149 (Wiener, J.,
dissenting) (“Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘contri-
bution’ as the ‘[r]ight of one who has discharged a
common liability to recover of another also liable,
the aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear.’
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides,
‘when two or more persons become liable in tort to
the same person for the same harm, there is a right
of contribution among them, even though judgment has
not been recovered against all or any of them’ and even
‘without . . . suit against [them].’  American Jurispru-
dence Second elaborates: ‘The equity for contribu-
tion arises at the time of the creation of the relation-
ship between the parties which gives rise to the right
and ripens into a cause of action for reimbursement
in favor of a party when, under a legal duty, he satis-
fies, by payment or otherwise, more than his just
proportion of the common obligation or liability. Or,
stated in terms applicable to actions at law, the im-
plied promise to contribute is considered as made
at the time the common liability is assumed, and the
right to sue thereon arises when a party has paid the whole of
the obligation or more than his share thereof.’”).
113.  Id. at 149 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
114.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (2005) (“No action
for contribution for any response costs or damages
may be commenced more than 3 years after—(A)
the date of judgment in any action under this Act for
recovery of such costs or damages, or (B) the date of
an administrative order under section 122(g) (relat-
ing to de minimis settlements) or 122(h) (relating to
cost recovery settlements) or entry of a judicially
approved settlement with respect to such costs or
damages.”).
115.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 584.
116.  Id.
117.  Sun Co., 124 F.3d at 1187.
118.  Id. at 1188.
119.  Id. at 1189.
120.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (2005) (“An initial
action for recovery of the costs referred to in [section
107] must be commenced – (A) for a removal action,
within 3 years after completion of the removal ac-
tion . . . ; and (B) for a remedial action, within 6 years
after initiation of physical on-site construction of
the remedial action . . . .”).
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panel’s decision, no definition of the term
“contribution”—whether in Black’s Law Dic-
tionary, the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
or American Jurisprudence Second112 —“re-
quires, as a condition precedent, that a party
be sued or adjudged liable before seeking
contribution; rather, the right to seek con-
tribution arises independently when one
tort-feasor, acting under a legal duty, dis-
charges more than his fair share of a liabil-
ity shared by joint tort-feasors.”113   Thus,
employment of the word “contribution” in
section 113(f)(1) does not require a narrow
interpretation of the statute.
Looking beyond section 113(f)(1) itself,
the Supreme Court majority argued that the
statute of limitations in section 113(g)(3)114
supports its interpretation of section
113(f)(1).115   Justice Thomas wrote, “[n]otably
absent from section 113(g)(3) is any provi-
sion for starting the limitations period if a
judgment or settlement never occurs, as is
the case with a purely voluntary cleanup.”
Thus, he continued, “[t]he lack of such a
provision supports the conclusion that, to
assert a contribution claim under section
113(f), a party must satisfy the conditions of
either section 113(f)(1) or section
113(f)(3)(B).”116   However, the language re-
lating to statutes of limitations is not dis-
positive of the scope of the cause of action
in section 113(f)(1).  In Sun Co. v. Browning
Ferris,117  the Tenth Circuit considered the
issue of what statute of limitations would
apply for a section 113(f)(1) cause of action
following an EPA administrative order.118
The lower court had found that section
113(g)(3) established statutes of limitation
only in the instance of a judgment or a
settlement.  Because section 113(g)(3) did
not specify a tolling time for administrative
orders, “the court turned to another area of
federal contribution law”119  to determine the
applicable statute of limitations.  The Tenth
Circuit rejected this conclusion, and held
that in the case of an administrative order,
section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA120  (“section
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113(g)(2)”) applies.121   Although section
113(g)(2) normally applies only to section
107(a) actions, the court interpreted the sec-
tion as applicable to section 113(f)(1) ac-
tions as well, so long as section 113(g)(3)
did not interpose itself.  Consistent with a
majority of courts, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ers section 113(f)(1) not to have created a
separate cause of action from section
107(a).122   Thus, the availability of the stat-
ute of limitation under section 113(g)(2)
suggests that section 113(g)(3), which is lim-
ited to judgments and settlements, cannot
be construed to limit the scope of the causes
of action available under section 113(f)(1).
B. The Legislative History
As noted, the Supreme Court did not
examine the legislative history of CERCLA.
The Fifth Circuit panel, however, while still
focusing primarily on a textualist interpreta-
tion of the statute, did examine the legisla-
tive history.123   Since section 113 came into
being when Congress adopted SARA in
1986, the court reviewed the reports of the
House of Representatives and Senate on
SARA.124   It found that “the legislative his-
tory of CERCLA reinforces our analysis of the
statutory text”125 —that in order for a PRP to
seek contribution from another PRP under
section 113(f)(1), the party must have been
held liable under section 106 or section
107(a).126   In particular, the court noted that
the House report mentioned that a party may
bring a section 113(f)(1) contribution action
even if a CERCLA action is merely pending
against it, suggesting to the court that some
form of lawsuit was contemplated.127
However, the Fifth Circuit en banc dis-
agreed with the panel’s interpretation of the
legislative history.  Noting that “CERCLA is
notorious for vaguely drafted provisions and
an inconclusive, if not contradictory, legis-
lative history,”128  the Fifth Circuit en banc
found that the legislative history was con-
tradictory as to whether Congress intended
to make the right of contribution available
only after the party had been sued under
sections 106 or 107(a).  According to the
Fifth Circuit en banc, congressional reports
suggest that Congress intended CERCLA to
allow federal courts to devise equitable so-
lutions for apportioning waste cleanup costs
among PRPs.129   What is more, congres-
sional statements expressing an intent to
limit the scope of section 113(f)(1) referred
to earlier versions that were never
adopted.130   Given the unclear legislative
history, the Fifth Circuit en banc concluded
that the legislative history provided “no
guide that should color the textual interpre-
tation of section 113(f)(1).”131
The Fifth Circuit en banc then pro-
ceeded to examine the purpose of CERCLA,
finding that it was intended to promote
cleanup and assign financial costs to the
responsible parties.132   The enormous costs
associated with hazardous waste
remediation make the availability of contri-
bution among PRPs critical for achieving the
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court held that a narrow reading of the sec-
tion 113(f)(1) cause of action would be in-
congruous with the purpose of CERCLA,
saying, “it would seem odd that a legisla-
ture concerned with clarifying the right to
contribution among PRPs . . . would have
rather arbitrarily cut back the then-prevail-
ing standard for contribution.”134   Thus, it
held that a section 113(f)(1) cause of action
does not require a prerequisite action un-
der sections 106 or 107(a).
C. Judicial Precedent Prior to Cooper
Industries: Cases Requiring a
Pre-Requisite Action
As noted, prior to Cooper Industries, courts
differed about whether section 113(f)(1) re-
quired a prior or pending action under sec-
tions 106 or 107(a).  Since the courts in the
Cooper Industries line of cases cite to those
earlier cases, they require some analysis
here.  This comment argues that, contrary
to the holdings of the district court, the Fifth
Circuit panel, and the Supreme Court, prior
court decisions weigh in favor of not requir-
ing a prerequisite action for a section
113(f)(1) claim.
The district court and the Fifth Circuit
panel relied heavily on Estes v. Scotsman Group,
Inc.135   The plaintiff in that case, similar to
Aviall, purchased a contaminated site, vol-
untarily undertook remedial action at the
prodding of a state agency, and then sued
the prior landowner for contribution under
section 113(f)(1).136   The court in Estes dis-
missed the section 113(f)(1) claim for want
of a prior or pending action under sections
106 or 107(a).137   It did so not based on its
own independent interpretation of section
113(f)(1), but based on what it perceived to
be the binding precedent of the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Rumpke of Ind. v. Cummins Engine Co.,
Inc.138   The court in Rumpke cited no source
for its holding that section 113(f)(1) required
a prerequisite action, but put forth a “plain
meaning” interpretation that a “section 106
or section 107(a) action apparently must ei-
ther be ongoing or already completed before
section 113(f)(1) is available.”139   As noted, a
“plain meaning” analysis of section 113(f)(1)
has inherent flaws, because of the ambiguity
of the term “may.”  Also, as Judge Wiener
pointed out in his dissent to Aviall II, the Sev-
enth Circuit’s comment about the scope of
section 113(f)(1) in Rumpke was dicta,140  and
another district court in the same circuit re-
fused to follow it.141
The district court also relied on
Ameritrust Co. National Association v. Lamson &
Sessions Co.,142  in which a landowner, again
similar to Aviall, purchased a contaminated
property, voluntarily conducted cleanup
operations, and then sued the prior land-
owner for contribution under section
113(f)(1).143   The Ameritrust court held that
because “Ameritrust does not, and cannot,
point to a third party that has threatened it
with potential liability . . . Ameritrust’s invo-
cation of the CERCLA provisions that allow
a defendant to seek contribution is inappo-
site.”144   The court relied on the purportedly
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plain meaning of the statute,145  but again,
a “plain meaning” analysis does not settle
the issue.
The court also cited as support146  the
decision in Rockwell International Corp. v. IU
International Corp.147   As Judge Wiener notes,
the court in Rockwell did not hold that the
“during and following” clause prevents a
party from seeking contribution in the ab-
sence of a prior or pending section 106 or
section 107(a) action.148  Rather, in cases
where no prior or pending action exists, the
court in Rockwell limited the immediate rem-
edy to declaratory judgment.149  The prob-
lem with Rockwell is that the court assumes
its own conclusion, in that it undertakes no
substantive analysis of whether section
113(f)(1) requires a prior or pending action
under section 106 or section 107(a).150   The
lack of analysis in Rockwell suggests that the
case provides only a weak basis for the con-
clusions reached by the district court.
The district court and the Fifth Circuit
panel both cited to OHM Remediation Services v.
Evans Cooperage Co., Inc.151   The Fifth Circuit
panel makes much of the fact that the OHM
court interpreted section 113(f)(1) to allow
“parties to bring contribution actions at least
as soon as they are sued under CERCLA.”152
However, although the OHM court held that
“a party may be ‘potentially liable’ by being
sued under the statute,”153  it did not hold that
section 113(f)(1) requires an earlier lawsuit or
judgment.154   The OHM court did state that a
“section 113(f) contribution action is deriva-
tive of an action under section 107(a)” and
concluded that “the district court’s dismissal
of OHM’s section 107(a) action served to void
the statutory prerequisite to suit under sec-
tion 113(f).”155   However, the court immedi-
ately proceeded to explain that because it was
remanding OHM’s section 107(a) claim for re-
consideration, “OHM still has a viable section
107(a) claim pending in the district court, and
therefore the district court’s first rationale for
dismissing the company’s section 113(f)
claims no longer holds.”156   Thus, the court’s
suggestion that dismissal of the section 107(a)
suit had the effect of voiding the section
113(f)(1) suit was not essential to the court’s
holding.  As dicta, the language does not bind
lower courts and provides a weak basis for a
narrow reading of section 113(f)(1).
The Fifth Circuit panel also cited United
States v. Compaction Systems Corp.157  for the
proposition that PRPs must be subject to li-
ability under CERCLA in order to bring a
claim under section 113(f)(1).158   But as Judge
Wiener noted, “that case merely held that the
act of settling with the United States satis-
fies section 113(f)(1)’s liability requirement
even though there has been no formal ad-
mission of liability.”159   The Fifth Circuit panel
also cited Southdown v. Allen160  for the propo-
sition that the purpose of section 113(f) is to
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be liable under section 107(a),161  but as Judge
Wiener pointed out, that case addressed only
whether plaintiff had contracted away his
right to seek contribution.162   Finally, the Fifth
Circuit panel also relied on Deby, Inc. v. Cooper
Industries,163  but that court did not dismiss the
complaint because plaintiff lacked the abil-
ity to bring a CERCLA claim, but rather be-
cause he had a CERCLA action pending in a
different court.164
In conclusion, of the cases cited in sup-
port of a narrow interpretation of section
113(f)(1), none put forth a compelling argu-
ment.  Instead, if they directly interpreted
the statute at all, they relied on the same
“plain meaning” interpretation that Justice
Thomas later used in Cooper Industries.  As
discussed, the “plain meaning” approach
falls far short of understanding what Con-
gress meant to accomplish in enacting sec-
tion 113(f)(1).
D. Judicial Precedent Prior to Cooper
Industries:  Cases Not Requiring a
Pre-Requisite Action
While the case law supporting a nar-
row interpretation of section 113(f)(1) is
questionable, there is case law on point that
supports a broad reading of section
113(f)(1).  The Fifth Circuit en banc pointed
out that although few cases have addressed
the direct question of whether section
113(f)(1) actions require a prior or pending
section 106 or section 107(a) action, most
circuits have allowed section 113(f)(1) claims
without a section 106 or section 107(a) ac-
tion.165   In his dissent to the Fifth Circuit
panel decision, Judge Wiener concluded that
even though the issue of “whether a party
may seek contribution under section
113(f)(1) in the absence of a CERCLA ac-
tion was not a contested issue” in many
cases, “[the] phenomenon only underscores
the common understanding among courts
and litigants alike that the plain language
of section 113(f)(1) does not require a PRP
to wait until it is haled into court to seek
contribution under the statute.”166   For ex-
ample, in Crofton Ventures LP v. G & H Partner-
ship,167  the Fourth Circuit “allowed a section
113 suit by a PRP who . . . had notified a
state agency of the contamination and then
cleaned up the facility,” and the absence of
a prior or pending section 106 or section
107(a) action “was of no moment.”168
Several cases that have addressed the
issue directly have found that section
113(f)(1) does not require a prerequisite ac-
tion under section 106 or section 107(a).
The Fifth Circuit en banc cited Pinal Creek
Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., in which the
Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument
that it could not pursue a section 113(f)(1)
action because it “had not incurred any li-
ability which would trigger” a contribution
claim under section 113(f).169   The court held
that a PRP may bring a contribution action
so long as it has incurred the necessary
costs of response for a hazardous waste site
consistent with the National Contingency
Plan, as called for in section 107(a).170   That
is, the only prerequisite for a section
113(f)(1) cause of action is the expenditure
of the necessary cleanup costs.  This inter-
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pretation of the statutory language is con-
sistent with the concept, agreed upon by
many courts, that the section 113(f)(1) cause
of action is linked to and dependent upon
section 107(a).171   Also, it is consistent with
the overall purpose of CERCLA to encour-
age remediation and assign costs to the re-
sponsible parties.172
Similarly, in Coastline Terminals of Connecti-
cut, Inc. v. USX Corp., the court held that a
“section 113(f)(1) claim is not barred merely
because the PRP has not been threatened
with liability.”173   The court cited the Sec-
ond Circuit decision in Bedford Affiliates v.
Sills174  as binding precedent.175   In Bedford,
the plaintiff incurred no prior liability under
section 106 or section 107(a), but had vol-
untarily undertaken cleanup pursuant to a
state consent order.176   The court properly
reasoned that the plaintiff could not bring
suit pursuant to section 107(a), because as
a PRP, he could not impose joint and sev-
eral liability on another PRP.177   Instead, the
plaintiff had to bring suit, if at all, under sec-
tion 113(f)(1), which calls for apportionment
of cleanup costs between joint
tortfeasors.178   Since a PRP plaintiff could
not bring suit under section 107(a), requir-
ing the plaintiff to incur prior liability before
bringing a section 113(f)(1) action would
effectively bar recovery, a result clearly con-
trary to the purpose and legislative intent
of CERCLA and SARA.
V. The Relationship Between Section
107(a) and Section 113(f)(1)
A. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
What is so unsettling about the Cooper
Industries decision is not just the excessively
narrow reading of section 113(f)(1), but the
fact that the Court also calls into question
long-standing judicial interpretations of
CERCLA.  Notably, writing for the dissent,
Justice Ginsburg did not address the
majority’s textual analysis of section
113(f)(1), but focused entirely on the bigger
picture—the relationship between section
107(a) and section 113(f)(1).179   Although
Aviall argued that it should be able to re-
cover costs under section 107(a) in the al-
ternative to a section 113(f)(1) claim, Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, “decline[d]
to address the issue,” because “[n]either the
[d]istrict [c]ourt nor the Fifth Circuit panel,
nor the Fifth Circuit [en banc] considered
Aviall’s section 107 claim.”180   Furthermore,
Justice Thomas declined to rule on whether
Aviall could pursue a section 107(a) cost
recovery claim as a matter of law.181
Justice Ginsberg took issue with this
conclusion and argued that Aviall had a valid
claim under section 107(a).182   First, Justice
Ginsburg called attention to the Court’s
decision in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States.  In
that case, the Court recognized the exist-
ence of an implied cause of action for PRPs
under section 107(a),183  consistent with case
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ing for the majority in Key Tronic, Justice
Stevens found that SARA “appeared to en-
dorse the judicial decisions recognizing a
cause of action under section 107 by pre-
supposing that such an action existed”185
and concluded that “the statute now ex-
pressly authorizes a cause of action for con-
tribution in section 113 and impliedly au-
thorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping
remedy in section 107.”186   Justice Ginsburg
noted that the majority and the dissent in
that case differed as to the source of the right
to sue under section 107(a), the former
holding that section 107(a) gave PRPs an
implied right to sue for contribution, and
the latter arguing that section 107(a) gave
an express right.187   Nevertheless, she em-
phasized that “no Justice expressed the
slightest doubt that section 107 indeed did
enable a PRP to sue other covered persons
for reimbursement . . . of cleanup costs.”188
She concludes that the section 107(a) im-
plied cause of action and the section
113(f)(1) cause of action are so similar as to
be interchangeable,189  and as a result, Aviall
should have a valid claim under section
107(a) as a matter of law.
Second, Justice Ginsburg argued that
Aviall could not have waived its right to sue
under section 107(a).  In the majority opin-
ion, Justice Thomas remanded the cases to
the lower courts to determine whether Aviall,
in dropping its section 107(a) claim from its
first complaint, had waived its right to re-
cover under that statute.190   However, Jus-
tice Ginsburg noted that Aviall had dropped
the section 107(a) claim solely in order to
conform to circuit precedent, which said that
section 113(f)(1) was the mechanism by
which a PRP must seek substantive recov-
ery made available through section 107(a).191
She wrote, “[a] party obliged by circuit pre-
cedent to plead in a certain way can hardly
be deemed to have waived a plea that a
party could have maintained had the law of
the Circuit permitted him to do so.”192
Third, Justice Ginsburg noted that the
Fifth Circuit held that section 113(f)(1) “gov-
erns and regulates” the cause of action un-
der section 107(a) and that the adoption of
section 113(f)(1) did not therefore eliminate
the ability of a PRP to seek cost recovery
under section 107(a).193   Accordingly, in
compliance with that precedent, Aviall had
asked the Fifth Circuit to adjudicate the
claim under section 107(a) if it rejected the
section 113(f)(1) claim.194   Thus, Justice
Ginsburg wrote, “I see no cause for protract-
ing this litigation by requiring the Fifth Cir-
cuit to revisit a determination it has essen-
tially made already.”195
B. The Scope of Section 113(f)(1)
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent calls atten-
tion to how Cooper Industries effects the hold-
ing of Key Tronic, where, as noted, the Court
held that section 107(a) and Section
113(f)(1) provide “similar and somewhat
overlapping” causes of action.196   Justice










Volume 12, Number 1
197.  Cooper Industries, 125 S. Ct. at 582 n.3.
198.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
199.  Aviall II, 263 F.3d at 139–40.
200.  Id. at 147 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
201.  Id.
202.  Aviall III, 312 F.3d at 687 (citing Key Tronic,
511 U.S. at 816).
203.  Id.
204.  See supra notes 182–189 and accompanying text.
205.  See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
206.  H.R. ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE REP. NO.
99-253, Pt. 1, 74 (Aug. 1, 1985) (“The Committee fully
subscribes to the reasoning of the court in the semi-
nal case of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation, which
established a uniform federal rule allowing for joint
and several liability in appropriate CERCLA cases . .
. .  The Committee believes that this uniform federal
rule on joint and several liability is correct and should
be followed.  It is unnecessary and would be unde-
sirable for Congress to modify this uniform rule.
92
Thomas actually refers to the two causes of
action as distinct.197   However, as noted, fed-
eral courts have been nearly unanimous in
holding that section 113(f)(1) is not a sepa-
rate cause of action from section 107(a), but
functions as part of section 107(a).198   Section
113 relies on the language of section 107(a),
because the latter specifies who may be sued
and what costs may be recovered.  Without a
link to section 107(a), section 113(f)(1) loses
grounding in the parameters that CERCLA sets
forth for all claims of cost recovery.  If section
113(f)(1) and section 107(a) create truly dis-
tinct causes of action, then the scope of sec-
tion 113(f)(1) is thrown wide open.
The unclear relationship between sec-
tion 107(a) and section 113(f)(1) raises the
issue of the meaning of section 113(f)(1)’s
saving clause.  That is, does the saving
clause of section 113(f)(1) preserve a sec-
tion 107(a) cause of action for PRPs?
As noted, the Fifth Circuit panel read the
saving clause as preserving only a party’s
ability to bring contribution actions under
state law, not under CERCLA.199   However,
this premise fails for several reasons.  First,
as Judge Wiener pointed out, “if . . . Congress
meant for the savings clause merely to ac-
knowledge that a party . . . may bring a state
action in response to state orders or judg-
ments . . . surely Congress would have made
that distinction explicit, as it did in CERCLA’s
general savings clause.”200   Second, Judge
Weiner said “short of making CERCLA pre-
emptive,” Congress cannot prohibit state
causes of action.201   CERCLA, in fact, co-ex-
its with state remediation law, rather than
preempting it.  Thus, because section
113(f)(1) posed no preemptive threat to state
causes of action, Congress had no need to
write statutory language with the intent of
preserving those causes of action.  The pur-
pose of section 113(f)(1) could not have been
to preserve causes of action under state law.
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit panel, the
Fifth Circuit en banc argued that the pur-
pose of the saving clause was to preserve
the ability of a PRP to sue under section
107(a), such that a PRP may bring a cause
of action under both section 107(a) and sec-
tion 113(f)(1).202   The Fifth Circuit en banc
said that Congress wrote the saving clause
in 1986 for the purpose of affirming earlier
court decisions allowing a PRP to seek con-
tribution from another PRP under section
107(a).203   This is essentially the same argu-
ment put forth by Justice Ginsburg in her
dissent to Cooper Industries, citing the prece-
dent of Key Tronic.204   The problem with this
interpretation is that it makes section
113(f)(1) indistinguishable from section
107(a), a result that is inconsistent with leg-
islative history and judicial interpretation.
As noted, prior to the passage of SARA,
courts generally agreed that section 107(a)
created joint and several liability between
joint tortfeasors.205   Congress explicitly en-
dorsed that approach to section 107(a) when
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also passed section 113(f)(1) “to allow
[PRPs] a cause of action to mitigate the
harsh effects of joint and several liability.”207
That is, where one PRP sues another, Con-
gress intended for the PRP to sue under
section 113(f)(1), which calls for apportion-
ment of costs in proportion to liability.  Sev-
eral circuits have, in fact, reached the con-
clusion that PRPs can sue another PRP only
under section 113(f)(1).208   In contrast, the
majority opinion of Cooper Industries errone-
ously forces voluntary PRPs to sue, if at all,
under section 107(a), where they can im-
pose joint and several liability on other
PRPs.
The question remains: if the saving
clause was intended to preserve neither a
state law cause of action nor a section 107(a)
cause of action, what was it intended to pre-
serve?  The only remaining plausible inter-
pretation of the saving clause is that it does
not preserve a separate cause of action at
all, but simply preserves the ability of a PRP
to sue under section 113(f)(1) absent a pre-
requisite “civil action.”  That is, the saving
clause suggests that PRPs may sue under
section 113(f)(1) not only after being sued
under Section 106 or section 107(a), but also
in the case of voluntary remediation or a
section 106 administrative order.209
In Cooper Industries, Justice Thomas sug-
gested that a section 106 administrative or-
der may not constitute an adequate basis
for a section 113(f)(1) claim.210   However, that
holding would force a PRP to refuse to com-
ply with a federal order for the sole purpose
of forcing the EPA to file suit—an absurd
result.  Congress could hardly have intended
to enact a scheme that discourages compli-
ance with an EPA order.  It makes more sense
that Congress would have intended to al-
low a PRP to bring a section 113(f)(1) cause
of action after becoming subject to an ad-
ministrative order.  As Judge Wiener noted,
“an administrative order is not a ‘civil ac-
tion,’”211  and the only way that a PRP could
sue under section 113(f)(1) after being sub-
ject to an administrative order is through
the saving clause.  Historically courts have
recognized actions brought under section
113(f)(1) by PRPs who have become sub-
ject to an administrative order.212
In summary, section 113(f)(1) does not
create a separate cause of action from sec-
tion 107(a), but for PRPs, section 113(f)(1)
provides the sole mechanism for seeking
contribution of Section 107(a) costs.  The
enabling clause allows a PRP to sue another
PRP after incurring cleanup costs under sec-
tion 106 or section 107(a).  The saving clause
clarifies that a PRP need not have been sub-
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jurisdiction, custody, or control of federal govern-
ment; land having PCB contamination subject to
remediation under TSCA; or a site which has received
assistance for leaking underground storage tank.”).
217.  Wagner, supra note 21, at 25–26.
218.  Id.
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ject to prior or pending litigation under sec-
tion 106 or section 107(a), but may seek
contribution even after undertaking a vol-
untary cleanup or becoming subject to an
administrative order to compel cleanup.
VI. Conclusion
Because Cooper Industries narrows the
options for cost recovery and compensation,
it will have a chilling effect on voluntary
cleanup efforts.  Although the decision it-
self does not foreclose the availability of a
section 107(a) cause of action, many circuits
have blocked PRPs from suing under sec-
tion 107(a).213   Thus, Cooper Industries does,
in effect, prevent recovery in areas under the
jurisdiction of those circuit courts.  In the
other circuits, Cooper Industries leaves PRPs
uncertain about their ability to recover, be-
cause as noted, the Court questions
whether the section 107(a) cause of action
survived SARA.214   This uncertainty means
that PRPs will refuse to engage in voluntary
cleanup efforts, which will delay or prevent
the remediation of contaminated sites.  Also,
the EPA and the court system will experi-
ence a greater administrative burden, as
PRPs await civil action before engaging in
cleanup activity.  What is even worse, some
PRPs will get away without having to pay
for the environmental damage that they left
behind, because PRPs who engaged in vol-
untary cleanup before the Cooper Industries
decision with the expectation of later seek-
ing contribution, may have now lost the
ability to sue.  This result completely sub-
verts the purposes and legislative intent of
CERCLA.
The potential chilling effect on volun-
tary cleanup spells trouble for state and fed-
eral brownfield programs.  The EPA started
working with state governments to estab-
lish brownfield programs in the early
1990s.215   Brownfield sites are properties
“the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of
which may be complicated by the presence
or potential presence of a hazardous sub-
stance, pollutant, or contaminant.”216
Brownfield programs remove a major bar-
rier from investment in potentially contami-
nated sites by limiting the liability of cur-
rent landowners and prospective buyers.217
Prior to 2002, the EPA entered into Memo-
randa of Agreement with several states, in
which the EPA promised to refrain from tak-
ing enforcement action against landowners
who conducted cleanup pursuant to a state
voluntary cleanup program.218   In 2002, Con-
gress codified and universalized this prac-
tice by passing the Small Business Liability













(“Brownfields Act”).219   After Cooper Industries,
however, a PRP will not be able to seek con-
tribution for cleanup costs from other liable
parties and therefore will have a major dis-
incentive from participating in a brownfield
program.
Because of the Supreme Court’s erro-
neous interpretation of section 113(f)(1),
and because of the chilling effects that Coo-
per Industries will have on the voluntary
cleanup of hazardous waste, Congress
should move quickly to amend CERCLA to
clarify that PRPs may sue for contribution
and cost recovery after performing voluntary
cleanup on hazardous waste sites or after
receiving an administrative order to compel
cleanup from the EPA.
219.  Amending CERCLA at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9601–
9675 (LexisNexis 2005); see also, Todd S. Davis,
Brownfields Redevelopment: Creative Solutions to Historical
Environmental Liabilities, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL
ESTATE AND COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: FROM BROWNFIELDS TO
GREEN BUILDINGS, 330–332 (James B. Witkin ed., 2004).
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